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1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in applying dynamic-style macro models to investigate issues of health
and longevity. Recent examples include Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hall and Jones (2007), who
study the economic value of health improvements and the reasons for the secular increase in health
spending in the US; and Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2011), who estimate the
economic gains associated to lower mortality rates around the world. A common feature of this
literature is the use of the expected-utility model. Although this type of framework has been used
to study a variety of macroeconomic and nance issues, it is not clear that it is also justied in the
study of longevity issues.
This paper documents a number of limitations in using the standard expected utility model to
study health and longevity, and proposes an alternative model that overcomes them. We identify
ve main limitations. The expected utility model predicts: (i) that individuals are indi¤erent
between late and early resolution of uncertainty, but when it comes to longevity, a variety of studies
suggest that many individuals prefer late resolution, particularly in cases of incurable diseases;
(ii) a constant marginal benet of survival, rather than the more intuitive diminishing marginal
benets; (iii) a positive relationship between the ratio of the willingness to pay for life extensions
to income, and both income and longevity; existing data, however, suggests a negative relationship.
Furthermore, calibrated expected utility models rely on non-homothetic preferences to replicate
plausible values of the willingness to pay for life extensions by relatively rich individuals. As a
result, the model predicts that: (iv) a sizable fraction of the world population would regard life as
a bad rather than as a good; and (v) an even larger fraction of the world population, mostly poor
to middle income individuals, would require an imputed compensation upon death that is lower
than the present value of foregone income.
We consider non-expected utility models along the lines proposed by Kreps and Porteus (1978),
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1990) and show that they can overcome the ve limitations
of the expected utility model. The key feature of the non-expected utility model considered here is
that it disentangles the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) from the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion (CRRA). In our context, risk aversion refers to risk associated with a very specic
gamble, that of life or death. We nd that when EIS is below the inverse of the CRRA, individuals
prefer late to early resolution of uncertainty regarding life-death lotteries, and the marginal benets
of survival are diminishing. Moreover, if the EIS and the CRRA are lower than one, then the
model predicts a negative relationship between longevity and the ratio of the willingness to pay
for life extensions to income. Since longevity and income are positively correlated in the data,
it also predicts that this ratio decreases with income, as suggested by the evidence. Finally, our
homothetic model can match the willingness to pay for life extensions by rich individuals without
implying a value of life below the present value of foregone income for poor to middle income
individuals.
Consider the ve predictions of the standard expected-utility model and the corresponding ones
in our non-expected utility model. First, expected utility models predict that individuals are in-
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di¤erent about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty as formalized by Kreps and Porteus
(1978). To x ideas, suppose a single coin toss. If heads, the consumption stream for periods 1
and 2 is 5 and 5. If tails, the consumption stream is 5 and 0. Since consumption at time 1 is
identical in both cases, expected-utility predicts that the individual must be indi¤erent between
tossing the coin at period 1 or at period 2. The prediction that individuals are indi¤erent about
the timing of uncertainty resolution is particularly implausible in the context of longevity issues.
Evidence suggests that many individuals prefer late resolution of uncertainty, what is sometimes
called "protective ignorance," in cases of incurable diseases. For example, studies regarding pre-
dictive genetic testing for the Huntingtons disease nd that a sizable portion of the population
at risk prefers not to know (Kessler, 1994; van der Steenstraten et al., 1994; Tibben et al., 1993;
Yaniv et al., 2004). Individuals cite as the major reasons to avoid being tested "fear of adverse
emotional e¤ects after an unfavorable diagnosis, such as deprivation of hope, life in the role of a
patient, obsessive searching for symptoms and inability to support ones spouse (Yaniv et al. 2004,
p. 320)." Wexler (1979) describes the results of 35 interviews with individuals at risk for the disease
as follows: "All of the interviewers were painfully aware that the disease is terminal, but for them
termination comes not at the moment of death but at the moment of diagnosis. Most fantasize the
period following diagnosis to be a prolonged and unproductive wait on death row" (p. 199-220).
Studies of HIV testing avoidance also nd that many individuals exhibit some type of protective
ignorance (Kellerman et al., 2002; Day et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2006). For example, Day et al.
(2003, p. 665) conclude that the major barriers to voluntary counselling and testing were "fear of
testing positive for HIV and the potential consequences, particularly stigmatization, disease and
death."
Non-expected utility models can explain why individuals prefer late resolution of uncertainty. It
occurs when the concavity associated to temporal deterministic uctuations of consumption is larger
than the concavity associated to atemporal random uctuations, that is, when EIS < (1=CRRA).
The intuition is the following. If uncertainty is resolved early, then consumption uctuations
become deterministic early on and the EIS plays the key role in determining utility. If uncertainty
is resolved late, then consumption uctuations remain random and the CRRA plays the central
role. When EIS < (1=CRRA) individuals prefer late resolution because it is a way to choose a
less concave utility function to evaluate consumption uctuations. Individuals who feel that death
comes at the moment of diagnosis are rationalized by the model as an individual with an EIS < 1,
so that lifetime utility is the minimum if any consumption is equal to zero. Preference for late
resolution di¤erentiates longevity issues from other economic issues such as the allocation of assets.
For example, studies of the equity premium puzzle usually nd that EIS > (1=CRRA) is required
in order to explain the large equity premium implying that, in the context of nancial markets,
individuals prefer early to late resolution. Putting these inequalities together, our paper suggests
that individuals are more averse to nancial risk than to health risks.
The second issue identied above is that the standard model predicts a constant marginal utility
of survival. This means that a patient in the model values equally a procedure that provides one
additional percentage point of survival regardless of whether the chances of survival without the
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procedure are 5% or 95%. This prediction conicts with the standard economic intuition that
individuals value more a good when it is scarce than when it is abundant. A constant marginal
benet of survival is a natural consequence of expected-utility formulations which are linear in the
probabilities. In contrast, our non-expected utility formulation implies linearity in probabilities
only in the special case EIS = (1=CRRA). However, if EIS < (1=CRRA) then the marginal
utility of survival is decreasing in survival. The intuition for this results is tied to why individuals
prefer late resolution. In our model, the time discount factor is proportional to the survival rate
raised to a power, a. If individuals are indi¤erent between early and late resolution then a = 1
and the discount factor is proportional to . Individuals who prefer late resolution are intrinsically
more patient in the sense that a >  or, since  2 (0; 1); when a < 1 . The fact that the discount
factor increases at a decreasing rate with  is what explains the diminishing marginal utility of
survival in our model.
The standard model also predicts that the value of statistical life (VSL) relative to income
increases with both income and longevity. The VSL is an estimate of the social willingness to pay
to save one life. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency employs a VSL of $6:3 million
for cost-benet analysis. Below we review various empirical estimates and their methods. The
prediction that the VSL-to-income ratio increases with income follows because life is a superior good
in the expected utility model, as stressed by Hall and Jones (2007). The prediction that the VSL-
to-income ratio increases with longevity follows from the fact that the value of life increases with
survival  for any income level, which increases the willingness to pay for life extensions. However,
the rst prediction is inconsistent with available evidence surveyed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a
cross-section of countries and a cross-section of individuals in the US. As we document below, this
evidence suggests that the VSL-to-income ratio is decreasing in income: poorer individuals seem
to value life relative to their annual income more than richer people do.
The non-expected utility model, on the other hand, can better replicate the cross-country
pattern of a decreasing VSL-to-income ratio. The key channel is the ability of the model to
generate a decreasing willingness to pay for survival as survival increases. According to the model,
the high value of life relative to income in poorer countries can be explained by the fact that life is
typically shorter in those countries and therefore more valuable. Specically, we show that when
the EIS < 1, the typical case considered in quantitative macro, and the CRRA < 1, then the
VSL-to-income ratio decreases with survival. Since survival and income are strongly positively
correlated in the data, the model can replicate a pattern consistent with the evidence documented
in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). The model can also explain the time-series pattern of increasing health
expenditures over GDP studied by Hall and Jones (2007). In their separable model, this pattern
results from life being a superior good. In our model, it results from the aging of the population,
which means that average remaining life span is shorter and therefore more valuable.
A fourth issue with the expected utility model is that it may imply a negative VSL for poor
countries and individuals. To illustrate this issue supposeW = u(c)+(1  )u(!) is the expected
utility of an (alive) individual: it weights the utility of being alive u(c), and utility of being dead
u(!); by the probabilities of each event. The value of life in consumption units can be dened as
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V SL = (W   u(!))=u0(c) in this example. This formula shows that !; which can be interpreted
as the minimum consumption level, is the key parameter to match the VSL in the expected utility
model, and more importantly, that ! is typically large. For example, if u(c) = ln c; as is commonly
assumed in macro, and ! = 0 then the imputed utility of dying is  1 and as a result V SL =1.
To match a plausible VSL, such as $6:3 million, it is necessary to assume a su¢ ciently high !: The
need for a large ! is not exclusive of the log utility formulation but, as we show, generalizes to
separable CRRA utilities, as well as other forms. This need is particularly acute when EIS < 1,
which is the typical case in macro, but it remains even when EIS > 1. The expected utility
model therefore has the prediction that additional years of life are a bad rather than a good for
those individuals whose consumption is below !. The reason is that when income is lower than
the calibrated !, as it may be the case in poor countries or for poor individuals, then the value
of life becomes negative. For example, Becker et al. (2005) estimate ! to be slightly below one
dollar a day, which would imply that a sizable fraction of the world population, over one billion
people, dont value life. But the evidence on the VSL surveyed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) indicates
that in the poorest country for which data is available, India, the VSL is positive. Based on wage
data for Indian manufacturing workers in 1990, whose average annual income was $778 (2000 US
dollars), estimates of the VSL are around $1 million, and they go up to $4 million when correcting
for self-selection. Life seems to be worth living everywhere. Although it is always possible to set
the minimum level of consumption so that life is worth living for all people around the world, this
can only be done assuming a VSL that is outside of the range of available estimates from micro
data for rich countries, specically between $4 and $9 million for the US (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003,
p. 6).
A nal issue with the expected utility model is that the imputed compensation upon death
for poor and middle income individuals is below the present value of foregone income. The non-
expected utility model, on the other hand, predicts that regardless of their level of income, the
VSL exceeds the present value of foregone income. The issue with the standard model is that a
single parameter controls both risk aversion and aversion to non-risky uctuations of consumption.
We show that by disentangling the two parameters it is possible to set a standard curvature of the
per-period utility function, so that EIS < 1 is possible, but without making dying innitely costly
even when ! = 0. In our non-expected utility model, the VSL is a positive function of the CRRA
but it is mostly independent of the EIS. As a result, we are able to set the minimum consumption
equal to zero, so that life is worth living everywhere, set any plausible value for EIS within the range
of existing estimates, and calibrate the CRRA to match a plausible value of statistical life in the
US. This is not possible with the expected utility model which, as a result, provides counterfactual
predictions for questions of health and longevity.
We investigate the quantitative predictions of our non-expected utility model by carefully cali-
brating it and using it to assess the economic values of longevity changes in a panel of 144 countries
and for the period 1970 to 2005. We compare our results to those of Becker et al. (2005) and Jones
and Klenow (2011), both of which use the expected utility framework, and document signicant
di¤erences. Figure 1 displays life expectancy at birth in 2005 relative to 1970 for a sample of 144
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countries. Except in the cases in which war or AIDS have shortened life spans, there have been
signicant gains everywhere else, with some poorer countries gaining as much as 26 years of life,
and richer countries gaining between 7 and 10 years. In contrast, per capita income di¤erences have
been quite persistent since 1970. With the exception of some growth miracles, income disparities
remain quite stable. Figure 2 portrays life expectancy and per capita income relative to the US in
2005. The gure suggests that while there is substantial cross-sectional inequality in income, with
a number of countries with less than 10% of US per capita income, there is less inequality in life
spans, with no country having less than 50% of life expectancy in the US.
We use calibrated versions of both the expected and non-expected utility models to compute
full measures of income that adjust for di¤erences in life expectancy, and compare them to standard
measures of income. While parameters are assumed to be common across countries, we let countries
di¤er on their per capita income and life expectancy at birth. Common parameters across countries
are either exogenously set to standard values used in the literature, or calibrated to relevant data
on the VSL in the US. For the non-expected utility model, the two key parameters are the EIS 1=;
and the CRRA . We exogenously set  = 1:25 following Murphy and Topel (2006) and calibrate
 to match a VSL of $4:5 million in the United States, one within the range of available estimates.
The calibration results in  = 0:57, so individuals are averse to the risk of dying, but the CRRA
is lower than one. As we discuss below, the calibrated value of  is smaller than one even for VSL
outside the $4 to $9 million estimated for the US. For instance, while  = 0:74 is consistent with a
VSL of $9 million,  = 0:85 implies a VSL of about $36 million. In other words, data on the VSL
provide a tight identication of mortality risk aversion, one that supports  < 1. Our calibration of
 = 0:57 implies that in 2005, the minimum VSL was the one computed for Zimbabwe at $26; 000,
while the maximum was $7:4 million in Luxembourg. However, the implied VSL-to-income ratio is
153 in Zimbabwe and 105 in Luxembourg.
The non-expected utility model yields novel predictions on the welfare e¤ects of changes in life
expectancy. Consider rst the welfare changes across time between 1970 and 2005. The expected
utility model implies that countries that lost life expectancy during this period experienced a
welfare gain. This is the case because VSL is negative in these countries, so that a shorter life span
increases welfare. In contrast, the non-expected utility model predicts the opposite: a full measure
of income that incorporates both changes in income and life expectancy indicates a welfare loss for
these, mostly poor, countries. Regarding countries that gained life expectancy between 1970 and
2005, which are mainly poor and middle-income countries, we show that the expected utility model
predicts a welfare loss for at least some these countries. The reason is that this model heavily
penalizes gains in life expectancy of even as much as 20 to 25 years because per capita income
remained mostly stagnant in these countries. In contrast, as the VSL is positive in all countries
under the non-expected utility model, large gains in life expectancy do show up as welfare gains
even for those countries whose per capita income remained stagnant over the 1970-2005 period.
The di¤erences between the two models in evaluating the welfare gains across time are substantial.
Consider now the cross-country welfare measures in 2005. In this case we compare each countrys
income and full income against that of the US in 2005. We show that in a cross-section, the expected
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utility model implies a "full income" world inequality that is lower than the income inequality. In
other words, once life expectancy is taken into account, poor countries fair better compared to the
US than when only per capita income is considered. The reason is that even though life expectancy
is much lower in these countries, under the expected utility model life is also worth less there
(shorter life spans are preferred). The predictions of the non-expected utility model are di¤erent.
Specically, under non-expected utility poorer countries fair even worse relative to the US when
a full measure of income is taken into account because life expectancy there is too low, while the
VSL-to-income ratio is high.
The model we propose can also be used to assess the welfare e¤ects of positive events like the
end of wars and devastating events like AIDS. For this purpose we compute full measures of income
to compare 1990 and 2005, the relevant dates to the AIDS pandemic. Countries that experience end
of wars, like Rwanda, Bhutan and Nepal gained 16, 12 and 11 years of life respectively between 1990
and 2005. From the perspective of the expected utility model, these relatively sizeable increases
in life expectancy do not change welfare as much. For instance, even though Rwandas per capita
income increased over this period, this model implies that welfare actually decreased there, a result
that reects the implied negative value of life in this country. The predictions of the non-expected
utility model are quite di¤erent: a longer life span directly adds to welfare. Similarly, this model
highly penalizes shorter life spans, as it is the case countries a¤ected by AIDS: Central Africa lost
3 years of life expectancy between 1990 and 2005, while South Africa lost 9, Botswana 13 and
Zimbabwe 19.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the mechanics of the
non-expected utility framework using a two-period model. Relevant empirical evidence on the
VSL is reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the standard expected utility model used in
the literature, calibrates the model, and derives its various counterfactual predictions. Section 5
describes the general non-expected utility model, calibrates it and discusses how its advantages. In
Section 6 uses both models to compute the welfare e¤ects of the observed changes in life expectancy
since 1970, as well as to evaluate the e¤ects of ending wars and the AIDS pandemic since 1990.
Concluding comments are in Section 7.
2 A two-period model
This section presents the basic mechanism of the paper in the context of a two-period model. It also
illustrates the limitations of the expected utility model and the advantages of a non-expected utility
approach. Consider an individual who lives for one period and may live for a second period with
probability : Life expectancy is 1 + . Consumption in the rst period is c0 while consumption in
the second period ec1 is a random variable equal to c1 with probability  or ! with probability 1 :
Parameter ! corresponds to the perceived consumption upon dying. The resolution of uncertainty
in this example may occur in the rst or second period, what is referred to as early versus late
resolution. Early (late) resolution means that the uncertainty about the second-period life-death
outcome is resolved in the rst (second) period.
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The lifetime utility of the individual is represented by the function:
V (c; ) = E0

u(c0) + u
 
v 1 (E1 [v(ec1)]) (1)
where c = (c0; c1); Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available at time
t = [0; 1], and u and v are strictly increasing strictly concave functions. In our example Et = E
because the probability of dying is constant. Function V (c; ) is of the non-expected utility type
but includes as a special case the following expected utility type,
V EU (c; ) = u(c0) + E [u(ec1)] ; (2)
where superscript EU denotes expected utility. This case occurs when either u = v; or when
uncertainty is resolved early. Specically, when uncertainty is resolved early we have
V (c; ) = 

u(c0) + u
 
v 1 (v(c1))

+ (1  ) u(c0) + u  v 1 (v(!)) = u(c0) + E [u(ec1)] ;
which implies that under early resolution, it is the concavity of function u the one that determines
the risk aversion associated to the second-period lottery.
When u 6= v and uncertainty is resolved late, V (c; ) becomes:
V (c; ) = u(c0) + u
 
v 1 (E [v(ec1)]) : (3)
In this formulation the degree of risk aversion is determined by the concavity of v; while u determines
aversion to intertemporal consumption uctuations. To see this more clearly, it is convenient to
dene the certainty equivalent associated to the lottery of life as c1(v)  v 1(E [v(ec1)]). Given
c1(v); lifetime utility can then be written as a deterministic ow of utilities u(c0) +u (c1(v)). The
only role of v is to determine the certainty equivalent: the more risk averse the individual is, as
dened by the curvature of v, the lower the certainty equivalent is. For example, linear v implies
risk neutrality, case in which c1(v) = c1 + (1  )!:
Comparing (3) and (2) it follows that the individual prefers late to early resolution of uncertainty
whenever v 1(E [v(ec1)]) > u 1 (E [u (ec1)]) or, equivalently, c1(v) > c1(u). In words, the individual
prefers late resolution when v is less concave (has less curvature) than u. This preference for
late resolution is consistent with the evidence presented in the introduction according to which
individuals avoid testing for fatal diseases, afraid that termination of life really comes at the moment
of diagnosis rather than at the moment of death. In this case, "protective ignorance" is preferred.
The expected utility model, by assuming u = v cannot be consistent with this preference, while the
non-expected utility model can.
Suppose further that u and v are of the CRRA type: u(c) = c1 =(1   ) and v(c) =
c1 = (1  ) where   0,  6= 1 and   0,  6= 1: In this representation, the EIS is 1=
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while the CRRA is : In the current context  captures aversion to the risk of dying. The restric-
tion   0 is required for risk aversion, although  < 0 is also possible if the individual is a risk
lover. The expected-utility model is obtained in the special case  = : If uncertainty is resolved
early, then  determines both intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, while when uncertainty
is resolved late, then  determines risk aversion. According to our discussion above, late resolution
of uncertainty is preferred whenever  > :
Given the assumed functional forms for u and v, (1) becomes:
V (c; ) =
c1 0
1   + 
(c1 1 + (1  )!1 )
1 
1 
1   : (4)
The following proposition summarizes four key properties of the model regarding longevity.
Notice that life expectancy is linear in : Therefore increases in life expectancy, or longevity, are
analogous to increases in :
Proposition 1 - Longevity under non-expected utility. (i) V (c; ) > 0 if and only if c1 >
!; (ii) V (c; ) = 0 if  = ; (iii) V (c; ) < 0 if and only if  > ; (iv) late resolution of
uncertainty is preferred if and only if  > :
Proof. The marginal utility of survival is given by:
V (c; ) = (c
1 
1 + (1  )!1 )
 
1  c
1 
1   !1 
1   :
This is positive if and only if c2 > !: Moreover,
V (c; ) =  (   ) (c1 1 + (1  )!1 )
 
1   1
 
c1 1   !1 
1  
!2
:
Thus, V (c; ) = 0 if  = , the separable case, or negative only if  > : Part (iv) follows
from the discussion above.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that survival, or life expectancy, is a good if and only if c1 > !:
As we show below, this simple restriction is di¢ cult to satisfy in calibrated versions of the expected
utility model. Part (ii) states that the marginal utility of survival is constant in the expected utility
model: longevity does not exhibit diminishing marginal utility. Part (iii) shows that the non-
expected utility model exhibits a diminishing marginal utility of survival when EIS < (1=CRRA)
meaning that the individual is relative more averse to non-random uctuations of consumption than
to random uctuations. If, for example, the individual is risk neutral ( = 0) then V (c; ) < 0
for any  > 0: The intuition for the diminishing marginal returns is that the added benets of
survival, in terms of higher future utility, are partly downplayed by the added gap between present
consumption and future certainty equivalent consumption, a gap that is more costly the larger the
.
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Consider next the predictions of the model regarding the willingness to pay for life extensions.
Suppose the individual has initial assets a0, incomes y in each period; markets are complete and
the interest rate is r. The life-time budget constraint of the individual is
c0 +  (1 + r)
 1 c1 = a0 + y +  (1 + r) 1 y:
The willingness of an individual to pay for a procedure that increases the chances of survival by
 is:
WTP =
@a0@
 = @V=@@V=@a0
The overall willingness to pay by a population of size N is N WTP , while the number of lives saved
by the procedure is N : The value of statistical life (VSL) is dened as the overall willingness
to pay to save a life:
V SL =
N WTP
N  =
@V=@
@V=@a0
:
Notice that a positive VSL requires c1 > !. Using (1), the VSL in this two-period can be written
as:
V SL = (!=c1; )  c1= (1 + r) : (5)
where
(x; )  1  x
1 
1   : (6)
Term c1=(1+r) in equation (5) is the present value of loss consumption in case of death. Coe¢ cient
(!=c1; ) is an adjustment over this present value, a premium if  > 1, or a discount if  < 1:
We call  the coe¢ cient of (relative) mortality aversion (CMA). If  > 1 the individual exhibits
mortality aversion in the sense that the imputed compensation in the event of death is higher than
the present value of loss consumption. In contrast, if  < 1 this imputed compensation is below the
present value of loss consumption. The case  > 1 is more plausible since most empirical estimates
of the VSL are consistently higher than the present value of loss consumption, as we review below.
The following proposition characterizes some properties of the CMA.
Proposition 2 - Coe¢ cient of mortality aversion. (i) (1; ) = 0; (0; ) = 1=(1   ) and
x(x; ) < 0; (ii) 


1
1  ; 

= 1; (iii) (!=c; ) T 1 if c T !
1
 1 :
Part (i) of Proposition 2 states that the CMA could be as low as zero if consumption if the
dead and alive states are identical, or as high as 1=(1   ): If x = 0; the CMA is constant and a
monotonic transformation of , the CRRA. In addition, the higher the consumption imputed upon
death, the lower the premium . Part (ii) describes the level of !=c at which (!=c; ) = 1, so that
the VSL exactly coincides with the present value of loss consumption. That level is 1=(1 ). This
implies that in the case of risk neutrality ( = 0); then  = 1 only if !=c = 0: Part (iii) states
that depending on the consumption level, the VSL may be larger, equal or lower than the present
value of loss consumption. If ! = 0, then the VSL is always higher than the present value of loss
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consumption. In this case the CMA maps one-to-one with the CRRA . This is our preferred case,
as it is consistent with the intuitive idea that the VSL should be bounded below by the present
value of loss consumption. In contrast, if ! > 0; then poorer individuals with consumption in the
interval [!; !
1
 1 ) have positive VSL, but value life below the present value of loss consumption.
Finally, if the individual is risk neutral ( = 0) but ! > 0; then (x; ) < 1 for all x  0.
To derive further intuition, suppose a0 = 0 and that the interest rate is such that consumption
is constant: c0 = c1 = y.1 The value of life in the expected utility case then be written as:
V SLEU (y; ; !; ) = y(!=y; ): (7)
The following proposition characterizes the VSL for the expected utility case.
Proposition 3 - VSL under expected utility. (i) V SLEU (y; ; y; ) = 0; (ii) V SLEU (y; ; 0; ) =
1 if  > 1 or V SLEU (y; ; 0; ) = y (1  ) 1 if  2 (0; 1); (iii) V SLEU (y; ; !; ) >
V SLEU (y; ; !; ) for  > 0 if ! > 0; and (iv) V SLEU (y; ; 0; ) = 0.
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition describe how V SLEU depends on ! : it spans the whole real
line when  > 1 but it has a nite upper bound when  2 (0; 1). The upper bound is reached when
! = 0: In particular V SLEU = 1 if EIS < 1 and ! = 0: The VSL is innite in this case because
dying is an unbearable state: it gives  1 utility. Since EIS < 1 is an empirically important
case, this property is key to understand why the expected utility model requires a su¢ ciently large
value of !=y to match a plausible VSL for the US, a requirement that remains important even
when EIS > 1. But a large value of !=y results in a counterfactual prediction: it means that
some individuals, those with consumption below !; do not value life. As shown below, calibrated
expected utility models predict that a sizeable fraction of the world population would not value
life.
Part (iii) of the Proposition 3 implies that the ratio of VSL to income increases with income. For
example, if all consumptions double ( = 2), so that income doubles, the VSL more than doubles.
As we show next section, this prediction is inconsistent with available evidence suggesting a VSL-
to-income ratio that decreases with income. Finally, part (iv) implies that the VSL is independent
of : This property is exclusive of the two period model. As we show below in a more general
expected-utility model, V SLEU (y; ; !; ) > 0.
2 According to the last two properties, the expected
utility model predicts that the VSL-to-income ratio is increasing in both income and longevity. The
evidence suggests otherwise.
1The required interest rate is:
1 + r = ( + (1  ) (!=y)1 )  1  =
In the expected utility case,  = ; this expression simplies to 1 + r =  1: In the non-expected utility case with
! = 0 and  2 (0; 1), the expression simplies to 1 + r =   1  =: We focus on these two cases in the paper. The
main results of the paper do not depend on this particular formulation of prices.
2The two period model misses the full impact of survival many periods. We show below an adjustment of the
order 1
1  is needed.
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In contrast, the non-expected utility model does not hinge on a positive value of ! in order to
match a plausible VSL. Suppose ! = 0 so that VSL is always positive for all consumption levels.
In this case equation (5) becomes:
V SLNE(y; ; ) = 
 
1  y(0; ) for  2 (0; 1): (8)
The restriction  2 (0; 1) is needed when ! = 0 to prevent Ev(ec1) = 0. The key parameter
determining the value of life in the non-expected utility model is : The following proposition
characterizes the VSL for the non-expected utility case when ! = 0:
Proposition 4 - VSL under non-expected utility. (i) V SLNE(y; ; 0) = y=(1+r); V SLNE(y; ; 1) =
1; and V SL(y; ; 1) > 0 for any   0 and 1 >  > 0; (ii) V SLNE(y; ; ) = V SL(y; ; );
and (iii) V SL(y; ; ) < 0 if  > :
Part (i) of Proposition 4 describes how the VSL depends on . Matching a nite VSL now
requires a large enough value of , but since ! = 0 has been assumed, the model predicts that
all individuals value life. Part (ii) implies that the VSL-to-income ratio is independent of income
when ! = 0, while part (iii) implies that the VSL decreases with survival (and longevity).3 This
property will allow us to show that the non-expected utility model is consistent with the empirical
evidence regarding the VSL-to-income ratio.
In conclusion, the expected and the non-expected utility models provide a very di¤erent ra-
tionalization of the value of life. In the expected utility model ! plays the key role, while under
non-expected utility  does. As a result, the models have very di¤erent predictions regarding how
the VSL responds to changes in income and survival. While in the non-expected utility model
all individuals, poor or rich, require a compensation in the event of death that is higher than the
present value of loss consumption, in the expected utility model poorer individuals discount this
compensation. This discount implies that the VSL falls below the natural lower bound implied by
the value of loss consumption. The models also di¤er in the implied preferences for the temporal
resolution of uncertainty.
3 Evidence on the value of statistical life
In this section we review the large literature estimating the VSL. Estimation is often based on wage
di¤erential across occupations with di¤erent mortality risks, or from market prices for products that
reduce fatal injuries. Both of these approaches have produced similar estimates of the VSL. To
illustrate this concept, consider a worker who requires an annual premium of $500 per year in
order to accept an increase in the annual probability of accidental death of 1=10; 000. In a pool
of 10,000 workers, one worker is expected to die and the aggregate compensation for such death is
3The two period model misses the full gains of surviving for many periods. As we show below, the adjustment
needed is proportional to

1   1 1 
 1
:
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V SL = $500  10; 000 = $5 million. Actual estimates of the VSL in the US range between $4 to
$9 million in 2004 dollars for a 40 year old male (Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). These
estimates have important policy implications and are used for policy evaluations. For instance,
the Environmental Protection Agency has used $6:3 million in cost-benet analysis since 1993.
Di¤erent values have been used in calibrated quantitative models. Murphy and Topel (2006) use
a value of $6:3 million in assessing the value of health and longevity, while Hall and Jones (2007)
calibrate their benchmark model to a lower value of $3 million. The calibrated model in BPS
implies a VSL for developed countries of between $1:5 and $2 million.
There are some estimates of the VSL in countries other than the US. Viscusi and Aldy (2003)
report the VSL and the average income from 21 di¤erent studies around the world published since
1982 (see their Table 4, p. 27-28). Countries represented in these studies include richer countries
such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and some developing countries
in Asia: Hong Kong, India, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although this international evidence tends to
produce estimates of the VSL that are lower than in the US, the order of magnitude is very similar
despite the quite di¤erent labor market conditions across these countries. One may be worried
that the estimates of the VSL are too high in developing countries, but as Viscusi and Aldy argue,
this is likely not the case. What lends credibility to these estimates is that in developing countries
on-the-job mortality risks are 3 to 5 times greater than the average ones in richer countries, while
average earnings are 2 to 4 times lower (p. 29). In situations when risks are very high, the estimated
VSL in the US is low. Thus, it is most likely the case that the estimates of the VSL in developing
countries are on the low rather than on the high side.
Figure 3 plots the ratio of VSL to income as a function of income (in 2000 US dollars) estimated
from the international studies documented in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). The correlation between
the two is  0:47 indicating that as as income increases, the VSL increases less than proportionally.
As it is apparent from the graph, this negative correlation is driven by the 3 studies in India, the
poorest country in the sample (average income of $778). There are no other studies for countries
with average income between $1,000 and $5,000 that would provide more estimates of the VSL
in these poorer countries. Fortunately, there are many more studies for the US that span some
variation in average income, at least between $20,000 and $50,000. Figure 4 plots the ratio of VSL
to income as a function of income from studies for the US as documented by Viscusi and Aldy
(2003) on Table 2 (p. 19-21) and Table 3 (p. 25). The correlation between the two variables is
 0:39 in this case, conrming a pattern similar to the cross-country ndings from Figure 3.
The evidence presented above indicates that the V SL=y ratio is decreasing in income. In
addition, the positive correlation between income and longevity illustrated in Figure 2, suggests
that the ratio V SL=y decreases with longevity. The expected utility model predicts a positive
relationship between the V SL=y ratio and income, as stated in part (iii) of Proposition 3. The
positive relationship is particularly strong for poorer countries or individuals with consumption
closer to !: As discussed above, the model also predicts a positive relationship between the V SL=y
ratio and longevity, which is also counterfactual. In contrast, the non-expected utility model
predicts no relationship between the V SL=y ratio and income (part (ii) of Proposition 4), but it
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predicts a negative relationship between this ratio and longevity when  > : Since income and
longevity are positively correlated in the data, the model is consistent with evidence of a V SL=y
ratio that is both decreasing with income and longevity.
4 The expected utility model
In this section we set up the general multiperiod expected-utility model of perpetual youth, explore
its predictions, and discuss its limitations.
4.1 A model of perpetual youth
The model in this section is in the spirit of Yaari (1965), Usher (1973), Blanchard (1985), Rosen
(1988), Murphy and Topel (2006) and particularly Becker, Phillipson and Soares (2005) BPS
henceforth. An individual has a probability St of surviving to period t. Preferences are of the
expected utility type:
E
" 1X
t=0
tu(ect)# = 1X
t=0
t [Stu(ct) + (1  St)u(!)]
where E[] is the mathematical expectation,  < 1 is a pure discount factor, u() is a standard
per-period utility function satisfying limc!0u0(c) = 1; and ct is consumption at time t if alive.
Notice that survival, St, is a good if and only if ct > !: As described by Kreps and Porteus
(1978), individuals endowed with these preferences are indi¤erent about the time of resolution of
uncertainty.
Assuming complete markets, the lifetime budget constraint is:
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
Stct =
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
Styt
where yt is yearly income. It is useful to consider a recursive representation of the problem. Let
t = St+1=St be the conditional probability of surviving up to period t+1 given that the individual
has survived up to period t. The individuals problem can be written as
Vt(at;t) = max
at+1
fu(yt + at   t (1 + r) 1 at+1)  u(!) + tVt+1(at+1; t+1)g (9)
where at are the initial asset holdings at time t, t (1 + r)
 1 is the price of bonds under complete
markets, and a0 = 0. The marginal utility of survival is given by
@Vt=@t =  u0(ct )at+1 (1 + r) 1 + Vt+1(at+1)
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where ct and at+1 are the optimal choices. The rst term represent the higher cost of saving
as higher survival rates a¤ect complete market prices. The second term is added utility upon
surviving. The willingness to pay for a  increase in survival and the value of statistical life are
given, respectively, by
WTPt =
@at@t
 = @Vt=@t@Vt=@at

and
V SLt =
WTPt
t
= 
Vt+1(a

t+1;t+1)
u0(ct )
  a

t+1
1 + r
: (10)
The expression above is quite intuitive. The VSL at time t is then given by the utility from
consumption in the remaining life expressed in terms of goods, Vt+1(at+1; t+1)=u0(ct ), minus the
cost of obtaining that utility, at+1= (1 + r). Both of these components are expressed in present
value since the increase in survival t a¤ects the individual starting in period t+ 1.
To further simplify the problem assume a constant probability of surviving t = ; constant
income yt = y; and a gross interest rate 1 + r equal to 1=. In this case the optimal solution is a
constant consumption path ct = y, and no savings at+1 = 0 for all t. We adopt these simplifying
assumptions in order to recreate a steady-state situation in which the representative individual in
each country receives the per capita income of the country every year of his life, and faces the
survival probability of his country as in BPS. Substituting these results in (9) provides the steady
state utility
V EU (y; ; !)  u (y)  u(!)
1   : (11)
Given that savings are zero, the marginal utility of survival is constant and the value of statistical
life becomes
V SLEU (y; ; !)  
1  
u(y)  u(!)
u0(y)
: (12)
The intuition for this expression is the following: the individual enjoys a utility ow of being alive
of u(y)   u(!) per period, which expressed in terms of goods corresponds to (u(y)  u(!)) =u0(y).
The V SLEU (y; ; !) is the present value of these ows discounted at rate . Notice that a positive
VSL requires y > !.
For the case of CRRA preferences u(c) = c1 =(1  ); equation (12) reads
V SLEU (y; ; !) =
y= (1 + r)
1   (!=y; ); (13)
where (!=y; ) is the CMA dened in (6) and characterized in Proposition 2. Equation (13),
a generalized version of (7), shows that the value of life is equal to the present value of income,
or human wealth y=(1+r)1  times the CMA. The following proposition, analogous to Propositions 1
and 3 above, summarizes the main theoretical predictions of the expected utility model. Dene
EU (y; ; !)  V SLEU (y; ; !)=y, the VSL-to-income ratio.
Proposition 5 - Properties of the expected utility model. Let t = ; yt = y; (1 + r) =
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1=, and u(c) = c1 =(1   ) in the expected utility model. Then: (i) the individual is
indi¤erent between early and late resolution of uncertainty; (ii) the marginal utility of survival
is constant; (iii) EU (y; ; !) > 0 and 
EU
y (y; ; !) > 0 if ! > 0; or 
EU
y (y; ; 0) = 0 if ! = 0;
(iv) V SLEU (y; ; 0) =1 and V SLEU (y; ; y) = 0 if  > 1; (v) (!=y; ) T 1 if y T ! 1 1 :
Proposition 5 describes the ve predictions of the expected utility model that limit its use in
studying longevity issues. These are the predictions discussed in the introduction. Parts (i) and
(ii) are self explanatory, while part (iii) implies that there is a positive relationship between the
VSL-to-income ratio and both income and longevity. Part (iv) implies that to match a plausible
VSL for rich countries and/or for rich individuals, a possibly large value of ! is needed, which results
in negative VSL for poor countries and individuals. As we show next section, this is the case not
only when  > 1, the value most commonly used in quantitative macro, but also when  < 1.
Finally, part (v) implies that individuals with income below !
1
 1 (> !) require a compensation
in the event of death that is lower than the present value of loss income.
4.2 Quantitative predictions
In order to investigate the quantitative predictions of the expected utility model, the following
parameters and functional forms are needed: ; c; ; u() and !. We set the risk free rate to 3%;
which implies  = 0:97; and let u(c) = c1 =(1   ). As in BPS, the spirit of the exercise is to
think of the average individual in a country as receiving a constant income y in every period, and
facing a constant survival probability as implied by the life expectancy of the country. For income
data we use 2005 per-capita income in PPP prices from the Penn World Tables Version 7.0, and
for survival probabilities we use the inverse of the 2005 life expectancy as reported in the World
Development Indicators. The values for the US are y = $42; 535 and  = 98:7% which corresponds
to a life expectancy of 78 years.
The only two remaining parameters to be set are  and !: Estimates of EIS = 1= range from
close to zero (for example, Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Hall, 1988; and Campbell and Mankiw,
1989) to around 1.2 (Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999). Estimates of !; the level of income
at which individuals in the model are indi¤erent between being alive or dead, are unavailable. An
upper bound for ! is $456 which corresponds to the $1.25 per day used by the World Bank to
dene the poverty line in 2005 (Chen et al., 2008). Such upper bound is unlikely to bind because
around 20% of the world population, or 1.4 billion people, was below this poverty line in 2005. A
more stringent upper bound for ! is $169 which corresponds to the income of the poorest country,
Zambia. The percentage of world population below such level was around 2:5% in 2005.4
Table 1 reports the VSL predicted by the expected utility model (equation 13) in the US for
various combinations of the EIS (1=) and !. For these same parameters, Table 2 reports the
level of per capita income at which (!=y; ) = 1, i.e., the level of per capita income at which
4Calculations were done using the World Bank interactive website at (last accesed 12/31/2012):
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1.
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the VSL is exactly equal to the present value of loss income (consumption). We denote this level
of income ymin, as incomes below this imply a VSL that falls below the natural lower bound, i.e.,
below the present value of loss income. According to part (v) of Proposition 5, ymin  !
1
 1 : As
seen in Table 1, the expected utility model predicts unrealistically high VSL for the range of most
commonly used values of the EIS, those below 0:85, and for any plausible value of !: Predicting
realistic VSL is key for health and longevity models in order to avoid overstating the importance
of health and survival issues. The expected utility model can match a realistic VSL when the EIS
is below one and ! is su¢ ciently large, or when EIS is larger than one. There are issues with both
alternatives. The rst has the counterfactual implication that since per capita income is below
$500 for the 1.4 billion people below the poverty line in 2005, a signicant fraction of the world
population would prefer to be dead according to the model. The second alternative requires an
EIS higher than the standard used in quantitative macro. Murphy and Topel (2006) use the rst
alternative, while BPS used the second.
Table 2 shows that depending on the choice of parameters  and !; the VSL for a considerable
fraction of the world population would be below the natural lower bound implied by the present
value of loss income. For example, consider the combination EIS = 1:25 and ! = $500, similar
to the one used by BPS, which implies a VSL of around 3 million for the US, close to three times
the present value of average incomes.5 In addition to the relatively high EIS, this parametrization
implies that individuals with incomes below $1; 526; or around 75% of the world population, require
a compensation upon death that is below the present value of their average incomes. In other words,
while calibrated versions of the expected utility model predict an accidental death compensation of
around three times the value of forgone income in the US, it predicts a compensation below forgone
earnings for around 75% of the world population. This model also predicts a VSL of around $77; 000
for India, or 1:35 times the present value of their earnings, which is implausibly low given existing
estimates. For example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report a VSL of around $1 million for Indian
manufacturing workers in 1990.
Figure 5 portrays the VSL-to-income ratio V SL=y for 144 countries in our sample for EIS =
1:25 and ! = $500. The gure conrms that V SL=y increases with income, as stated in Proposition
5, but also shows that the predicted ratio sharply increases with income. This robust prediction
of the expected utility model is nonetheless inconsistent with the empirical evidence reported in
Figures 3 and 4 which instead suggests a decreasing ratio. Second, the model predicts a negative
value of life for 5 countries in the sample, all of them African countries. As discussed above, it is
in principle feasible to choose a lower value of ! so that the VSL is positive for all countries but
at the cost of obtaining implausible high values for the US and other rich countries. Furthermore,
this would only shift up the curve in Figure 5 without changing its increasing shape.
5The implied value of ! in BPS is $353 in 1990 dollars, which corresponds to $493 in 2005 dollars.
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5 A non-expected utility model
This section shows that non-expected utility models, along the lines of the Kreps and Porteus (1978),
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989), can solve the limitations of the expected utility model
documented in the previous section. These models o¤er the natural starting point because they
maintain the axioms of von Neumann-Morgensten preferences except the reduction of compounded
temporal lotteries, breaking the indi¤erence to temporal lotteries. Therefore, non-expected utility
can naturally account for the evidence suggesting that individuals prefer late resolution of uncer-
tainty in certain medical situations. Surprisingly, a preference for late resolution of uncertainty also
xes some other limitations of the expected utility model in studying longevity.
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) provide a simple parametric class of Kreps and Porteus
(1978) preferences characterized by a constant EIS and a constant, but unrelated, CRRA. We refer
to this parametric class as the EZW preferences. While the EIS determines the degree of aversion
to temporal deterministic consumption uctuations, the CRRA determines the degree of aversion
to atemporal stochastic consumption uctuations. Late resolution of uncertainty is obtained when
EIS < (1=CRRA). The added exibility of the EZW preferences allows us to simultaneously
choose an EIS below one, as is the typical case in many macro applications, and ! = 0 so that life
is worth living everywhere, without the unappealing implication that the VSL is innite, as would
be case with the expected utility model. Instead, the V SL is the target that allow us to identify the
CRRA. Finally, the model predicts that ratio V SL=y decreases with longevity, and since longevity
and income are positively correlated, the model is consistent with the pattern displayed in Figures
3 and 4.
5.1 The model
Consider the following parametric version of Kreps and Porteus (1978) preferences formulated by
Epstein and Zin (1989):
Wt = (1  ) 1
h
c1 t + [(1  )EtfWt+1] 1 1  i 1 1  ; (14)
where   0 and   0. The main feature of these preferences is that they separate intertemporal
substitution from risk aversion: the EIS is 1= while  is the CRRA. The expected utility case
is obtained when  = . While the formulation above has been used in the context of nancial
risk, the specic lottery we are interested in is a more extreme one, namely a life-death lottery.
It is important to keep in mind that while existing applications of equation (14) associate  with
aversion to nancial risk, here we associate  with aversion to mortality risk.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) show that agents exhibit a preference for late (early) resolution of
uncertainty depending on whether lifetime utility is concave (convex) in EtfWt+1: In the case of
equation (14), preference for late resolution requires  > ; or equivalently EIS < (1=CRRA). In
the context of nancial risk, Vissing-Jorgenson and Attanasio (2003) present evidence to support a
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preference for early resolution of uncertainty, namely EIS > (1=CRRA). In contrast, the medical
evidence discussed above and the calibration exercise we present next section suggest that in the
context of a life-death lottery, late resolution of uncertainty is preferred. Taken together, these
observations suggest that individuals are more willing to accept a large consumption jump upon
dying, than to accept consumption jumps while alive. Moreover, since EtfWt+1 is linear in the
survival probability, then the concavity required for late resolution of uncertainty also implies
diminishing marginal benets of surviving.
In what follows we use a more compact formulation of (14), one used by Epstein and Zin (1989).
Dening V  (1  )W 11  ; (14) can be written as
Vt =
h
c1 t + [Et eV 1 t+1 ] 1 1  i 11  : (15)
This formulation is not only compact but also convenient because V 2 [0;1] while W 2 [ 1;1];
so that the minimum lifetime utility is V = 0.
As in the previous section, let ! be the perceived consumption upon dying. Then (15) can be
written as
Vt =
h
c1 t + [tV
1 
t+1 + (1  t)D1  ]
1 
1 
i 1
1 
; (16)
where
D =
h
!1  + [tD1  + (1  t)D1  ]
1 
1 
i 1
1 
= ! (1  ) 1 1 :
Equation (16) implies that Vt is increasing in t as long as Vt+1 > D. From now on we assume
! = 0 (or D = 0) so that for any individual with positive consumption life is always a good rather
than a bad. In the expected utility model of the previous section such assumption would restrict the
EIS to be larger than one in order to avoid lifetime utility to become minus innite and the VSL to
become innite. In the non-expected utility model the assumption ! = 0 does not restrict the EIS,
which can take standard values, but instead it requires  < 1. Otherwise, if  > 1 and ! = 0 then
Vt = 0 if  > 1, or Vt = ct if  2 (0; 1). This means that with  > 1 death becomes an unbearable
state as it destroys any value of living either in all periods, if  > 1, or in the future, if  2 (0; 1);
driving the VSL to innite. As we discuss below, the restriction on  is not binding because  < 1
is required to match the observed VSL. Finally, the assumption ! = 0 is also convenient because
it reduces notation signicantly without major costs: any plausible calibration would require ! to
be small anyway. Letting ! = 0 in (16) results in:
Vt =
h
c1 t + ~(t)V
1 
t+1
i 1
1 
(17)
where ~()   1 1  . Notice that all the e¤ect of uncertainty is fully captured by the adjusted
discount factor ~(); as in the standard perpetual youth model. The preference for late resolution
of uncertainty is reected in the fact that ~() >  when  >  meaning that mortality risk makes
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the individual more patient.
Individuals choose a consumption path to maximize utility subject to a lifetime budget con-
straint. Assuming complete markets and a constant interest rate, the individuals problem can be
written recursively as:
Vt(at;t) = max
at+1
f

yt + at   t (1 + r) 1 at+1
1 
+ ~ (t) (Vt+1(at+1; t+1))
1  g 11 
where at are the initial asset holdings at time t and t (1 + r)
 1 is the price of bonds under complete
markets.
The implied optimal consumption is given by
ct = c0


 
1  (1 + r)
t=
: (18)
Notice that when  =  this condition reduces to the standard optimal consumption obtained under
expected utility. The equation shows that consumption grows faster the more the individual cares
about the future, the larger the return on savings, 1+r; but also the larger 
 
1  . If  =  then the
survival probability does not a¤ect consumption growth because it a¤ects equality the marginal
utility of consumption and the marginal cost, as prices reect changes in the survival probability.
If  < ; which is the case we stress, then consumption growth is larger than in the expected utility
case as individuals are e¤ectively more patient.
5.2 The value of statistical life
The value of statistical life in the non-expected utility model is given by:
V SLt =
@Vt=@t@Vt=@at
 = ~0 (t) V 1 t+1 (at+1;t+1)c t (1  )   a

t+1
1 + r
:
This expression is analogous to (10).6 The VSL at time t is the change in the weight that the
individual gives to the future, ~
0
(t) ; times the future lifetime utility expressed in terms of goods,
V 1 t+1 (a

t+1;t+1)c

t (1  ) 1, minus the cost of obtaining that utility, at+1=(1 + r). As in the
previous section and in order to further simplify the problem assume a constant probability of
surviving t = ; constant income yt = y; and a gross interest rate 1 + r equals to 
 
1  =. In this
case the optimal solution is a constant consumption path ct = y, and no savings at+1 = 0 for all t.
6To obtain an expression that is directly comparable with expression (10), remember that V  (1  )W 11  :
Therefore,
V SLt = ~
0
(t)
1 
1 W
1 
1 
t+1 (a

t+1;t+1)
c t
  a

t+1
1 + r
:
Expression (10) is obtained when  = :
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Substituting these restrictions into (17) results in the steady state utility:
V (y; )  y=
h
1  ~()
i1=(1 )
: (19)
In addition, the value of statistical life simplies to:
V SL(y; ) =
y= (1 + r)
1  ~() (0; ): (20)
where (0; ) is the CMA and the present value of lifetime income is given by y=(1+r)
1 ~() . Expression
(20) is similar to (13), the one for the expected utility model. Both formulas are in fact identical
when  =  < 1 and ! = 0 but there are some key di¤erences otherwise. First, the VSL is nite
in the non-expected utility model for any   0: Recall that the expected utility model predicts
an innite VSL when  > 1 and ! = 0: This is a key improvement over the expected utility model
because it eliminates all the issues discussed above when ! = 0 and  > 1, a quite reasonable set
of parameters. Second,  is the key parameter determining the VSL, not : Since the expected
utility model model forces  = , then  becomes crucial in that model, but once this assumption
is relaxed then  losses its key importance and the weight of the prediction lies on : Third, the
CMA is always larger than one meaning that the VSL is always larger than the present value of
incomes, the natural lower bound. Fourth, the VSL in equation (13) is proportional to income
y. This implies that richer countries have a higher VSL than poorer countries, a prediction also
true in the expected utility model. However, di¤erent from that model, equation (13) implies that
the ratio V SL(y; )=y is independent of income, but it decreases with  under certain conditions.
The following proposition, analogous to Proposition 5 above, summarizes the main theoretical
predictions of the non-expected utility model. Dene (y; )  V SL(y; )=y:
Proposition 6 - Properties of the non-expected utility model. Let t = ; yt = y; 1 + r =

 
1  = and  >  in the non-expected utility model. Then: (i) the individual prefers
late resolution of uncertainty; (ii) there are diminishing marginal benets to survival; (iii)
y(y; ) = 0 and (y; ) < 0 if  > 1 > , or (y; ) > 0 if 1 >   ; (iv) V SL(y; ) > 0
for any y > 0 and V SL(y; ) <1 for any   0; and (v) (0; ) > 1 for any y and :
Proof. Proofs were given in the text above except the characterization of (y; ): Notice that
(y; ) =
1
(1  )2
1 
1 

1   1 1 
 1 
(   ) + (1  )  1 

1   1 1 
 1
; (21)
so that if  > 1 >  then (y; ) < 0 while if 1 >    then (y; ) > 0.
Proposition 6 implies that the predictions of the non-expected utility model regarding the ratio
V SL(y; )=y are quite di¤erent from the ones obtained with the expected utility model. As stated
in part (iii), V SL(y; )=y is independent of y and it only depends on . However, since in the
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cross-country data survival  (or life expectancy) is positively correlated with y, increases in  can
be thought of as increases in y. In light of this, the main insight of Proposition 6 is that if  > 1 > ,
which is our preferred case, the non-expected utility model is consistent with the decreasing pattern
of V SL=y portrayed in Figures 3 and 4. It is not possible to generate this pattern with the separable
model. To understand the intuition of this key result, consider the other cases in Proposition 6.
First, if 1 >  = , then the model reduces to the separable framework with ! = 0 and equation
(21) implies that V SL(y; )=y is increasing in . This case is described in Proposition 5. Second,
if 1 >  > , then we again have that V SL(y; )=y is increasing in . Thus, these two cases imply
that as long as    the ratio V SL=y does not behave as implied in Figures 3 and 4. The reason
is that when 1 >  > , then mortality risk aversion is relatively higher. This implies that relative
to their income, the value of life in countries where high life expectancy is higher than in countries
with shorter life spans. The opposite holds when  > 1 > , case in which mortality risk aversion
is relatively lower. In this case the model implies that relative to their income, the value of life in
countries with already high life expectancy is lower than in countries where life is scarce ( is low).
Most quantitative macro models assume that the EIS is low ( > 1). If in addition, mortality
risk aversion is low in the sense that  > 1 > , then we have a framework in which: (i) life is worth
living everywhere (! = 0); and (ii) relative to income, the value of life is higher where life is scarce,
which is in poorer countries. These two observations are consistent with the available evidence
on the VSL. In addition, they originate from a model in which individuals are not indi¤erent to
the timing in which death uncertainty is resolved, a quite reasonable implication for a dramatic
event such as death. We now turn to calibrate the non-expected utility model and to quantitatively
compare its predictions with the expected utility one.
5.3 Calibration and results
In this section we calibrate the non-expected utility model and explore its quantitative implications.
We set ! to zero and r = 3%. We follow Murphy and Topel (2006) and set  = 1:25: As in section
4.2, we use country specic values for  and y using the World Development Indicators and the
Penn World Tables 7.0. The only new parameter is . We calibrate this parameter to target a VSL
of $4:5 million in the US in 2005. We select a conservative value in the low end of the $4 to $9
million interval reported in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). This results in  = 0:57. Larger targets for
the VSL result in larger calibrated values of , but it is always the case that  < 1. For instance,
if the VSL is set to $9 million in the US, the calibrated  equals 0:74. In addition, a  = 0:85 is
consistent with a VSL of about $36 million, well above the range of available estimates. In sum,
the data on the VSL strongly suggest  < 1. We prefer the conservative value of  = 0:57, but the
main message of our exercise also holds for other calibrations with  < 1.
In order to compare the expected and non-expected utility models, we recalibrate the former
to be consistent with the same VSL of $4:5 million in the US. Setting  = 1:25, the value of !
consistent with this VSL is ! = $2; 000. This value of ! implies that in 41 countries out of our
sample of 144 countries the VSL is negative.
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Figure 6 displays the ratio V SL(y; )=y for both the non-expected and the expected utility
models for all countries in the sample in 2005. Results are quite di¤erent for both models. Di¤erent
from the expected utility case, there are no negative VSL for any country under the non-expected
utility model. More importantly, consistent with Proposition 6, the pattern of ratio V SL(y; )=y
is quite di¤erent: increasing in y under the expected utility model and decreasing in y under non-
expected utility. Figure 6 suggests that for countries with a per capita income above $10,000 in
2005, about 25% of the per capita income in the US, the ratio V SL(y; )=y converges to 100. This is
the case because as shown in Figure 2, life expectancy is quite similar among those countries. Most
of the dispersion in the ratio V SL(y; )=y occurs for countries below $10,000 of per capita income.
Although V SL(y; )=y converges 100 in Figure 6, higher ratios could be obtained selecting higher
calibration targets for the VSL in the US. The micro evidence reported in Figures 3 and 4 suggest
a ratio of about 300, but we have calibrated our model taking a more conservative level for the
VSL. In sum, our calibrated non-expected utility model is consistent with the negative correlation
between V SL(y; )=y and y displayed in Figures 3 and 4, while the expected utility model is not.
The correlation between V SL(y; )=y and y under the non-expected utility model in Figure 6 is
 0:55.
Figure 7 is similar to Figure 6 but it displays V SL(y; )=y as a function of life expectancy.
Overall, Figures 6 and 7 suggest that under the non-expected utility model, longer life is valued
all around the world, including poorer countries. In fact, as a percentage of per capita income, the
non-expected utility model implies that life is relatively more valued where it is more scarce: in
poorer countries.
6 World inequality
In this section we use the calibrated expected and the non-expected utility models in order to
analyze two issues. First, we evaluate welfare across countries and time by jointly accounting for
the changes in per capita income and life expectancy. This welfare evaluation is micro-founded in
a model in which individuals value both income and length of life, and provides a theory-based
perspective of world inequality. Second, since the models we calibrated above imply a VSL in each
country, they have implications for the welfare cost of war and AIDS. We illustrate these predictions
for a number of countries in which either wars have ended or AIDS has become widespread.
6.1 Welfare across countries and time
How does world inequality looks like when per capita income measures are adjusted to include
di¤erences in life expectancy? Even though per capita income has remained stagnant in a number
of poor countries between 1970 and 2005, there have been large gains in life expectancy during
the same period. This suggest world inequality has e¤ectively fallen. This section uses the models
presented above to compute welfare measures across time and across countries. Specically, we
are interested in using the formula for V (y; ) in order to calculate a "full measure" of income
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adjusted for changes in life expectancy, T = 1=: Let V0  V (y0; 0) be the welfare in a benchmark
situation and Vi  V (yi; i) the welfare in another situation i. For welfare measures across time,
or growth calculations, the subscripts 0 and i refer to two di¤erent years for a given country, while
for cross-country comparisons they refer to two di¤erent countries in a given year. The ratio of per
capita income is Ri = yi=y0 and it is the typical way to measure proportional welfare di¤erences
between both situations.
We now dene a more comprehensive ratio of incomes that includes an imputed value for
di¤erences in life expectancy. We denote this ratio RFi where F stands for "full" income ratio
which is dened implicitly by
V (RFi y0; 0) = V (yi; i) (22)
so RFi is the proportional change in y0 required to equate welfare in both situations. Notice that
RFi = Ri if 0 = i; and R
F
i 7 Ri if i 7 0:
RFi for the expected (EU) and non-expected utility cases can be easily obtained using (11) and
(19) for the CRRA utility case. The solutions are given by:
RF EUi =
"
1  0
1  i

yi
y0
1 
+

1  1  0
1  i

!
y0
1 # 11 
(23)
and
RFi =
yi
y0
0@1   1 1 0
1  
1 
1 
i
1A
1
1 
: (24)
The solution for the expected utility case is a CES function between the situations in the alive
and dead states with a weight, (1  0) = (1  i) that measures the relative change in "e¤ective
mortality rates". The larger the change in mortality the higher the weight assigned to the alive
state. Moreover, the lower the  the more substitutable is the consumption between the two states
and the larger the value imputed to mortality changes.
For welfare calculations across time, we use as situation 0 the year 1970 and situation i 2005 for
each country. Figure 8 displays our relative full income measures across time for both the expected
and the non-expected utility models. Specically, the gure shows RF EUi =Ri and R
F
i =Ri as a
function of the changes in life expectancy between 1970 and 2005. Notice that countries to the far
right of the gure are those that substantially gained life expectancy, generally poorer countries.
Those on the far left of the gure are also poorer countries, but they lost life expectancy most
likely due to war and AIDS. As richer countries had more modest gains in life expectancy, they are
concentrated around zero. Figure 8 indicates that the expected and non-expected utility models
have similar predictions for richer countries. In addition, ratios RF EUi =Ri and R
F
i =Ri are closer
to one for this set of countries. For the rest of the countries, however, the di¤erences between the
models displayed in Figure 8 are substantial. An interesting feature of Figure 8 is that for those
countries that lost life expectancy between 1970 and 2005, RF EUi =Ri > 1 while R
F
i =Ri < 1: This
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is the case because since under the expected utility model the VSL is negative in these countries
(y < !), then shorter life spans across time increase welfare in a full measure of income. Turning
now to countries that gained life expectancy between 1970 and 2005, consider those that gained at
least 15 years of life: while RF EUi =Ri is well above 1:5 for these countries, R
F
i =Ri is either slightly
above or in some cases below one. These calculations suggest that the expected utility model
heavily penalizes the welfare gains of non-trivial increases in life expectancy in cases in which per
capita income remains stagnant. In contrast, as the VSL is positive in all countries under the
non-expected utility model, gains in life expectancy do show up as welfare gains even for those
countries whose per capita income remained stagnant over the 1970-2005 period. This time series
analysis implies a decrease in world income inequality between 1970 and 2005, one that is specially
pronounced under the non-expected utility model.
For welfare calculations across countries in 2005, we label the US as 0 and each of the other
countries as i in equations (23) and (24). Figure 9 reports the results of the cross-country wel-
fare calculations. Specically, the gure plots RF EUi =Ri and R
F
i =Ri against life expectancy in
2005. The remarkable feature of this gure is that RF EUi =Ri (expected utility model) exhibits
a decreasing pattern, while RFi =Ri (non-expected utility) is increasing. A high and larger than
one RF EUi =Ri for poor countries means that once life expectancy is taken into account into a
full measure of income, poor countries fair better compared to the US than when only per capita
income is considered. The reason is that life expectancy is much lower in these countries, but in
the expected utility model life is also worth less there (the ratio V SL=y is low). Things are almost
the opposite according to the non-expected utility model. For almost all countries RFi =Ri < 1 and
RFi =Ri is an increasing function of life expectancy. In this case, poorer countries fair worse relative
to the US when a full measure of income is taken into account because life expectancy there is
too low. In sum, Figure 9 implies that while world inequality in the cross-section is lower than
previously thought in the expected utility model, it is actually higher in the non-expected utility
model. Despite the observed gains in life expectancy since 1970, life is still too short in poorer
countries. These are the places where, relative to income, the non-expected utility model predicts
a higher value of life.
6.2 Wars and AIDS
We now explore the di¤erences between the expected and non-expected utility models in assessing
the welfare e¤ects of positive events like the end of wars and devastating events like AIDS. Table
3 compares the predictions of both models for selected countries. We compute welfare across time
using equations (23) and (24), selecting year 1990 as situation 0 and 2005 as situation i 2005 for
each country. These dates are relevant to the AIDS pandemic. Countries in Table 3 are classied
into two groups according to whether they gained or lost life expectancy between 1990 and 2005.
An interesting pattern emerges from the table. Countries like Rwanda, Bhutan and Nepal gained
16, 12 and 11 years of life respectively. From the perspective of the expected utility model, these
relatively sizeable increases in life expectancy do not change welfare as much. Specically, the ratio
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of per capita income R is very similar to the full income ratio RFs. In fact, in the case of Rwanda,
RFs < R implying that even a life-span gain of 16 years in highly penalized under the expected
utility framework. This is the case even if Rwanda experience an 8% increase in per capita income
over this period. The predictions of the non-expected utility model are quite di¤erent: a longer life
span directly adds to welfare.
Consider now countries that lost years of life, mostly due to AIDS: Central Africa (3 years),
South Africa (9), Botswana (13) and Zimbabwe (19). Both Central Africa and Zimbabwe not only
lost years of life, but also per capita income (respective drops of 26 and 30%). The table indicates
that the non-expected utility model highly penalizes these shorter life spans, much more than the
expected utility model does. Take for instance the case of Zimbabwe. For this country, RF EU > R
implying that relative to a welfare measure with only income, 19 less years of life turn out to be
welfare improving! In contrast, the non-expected utility model implies Zimbabwes full measure
of welfare is simply abysmal (RF = 0:2). Table 3 illustrates that our non-expected utility model
implies very high welfare costs of AIDS in Africa.
7 Concluding comments
Death and terminal illnesses are extreme events. Many health decisions implicitly or explicitly have
to deal with the possibility of dying, or facing daunting incurable illnesses such as Alzheimer or
dementia. Expected utility models predict that, in the absence of potential treatments, individuals
should be indi¤erent about the timing of resolution of uncertainty. The non-expected utility model
explored in this paper predicts instead that individuals would prefer late resolution. Our model is
consistent with micro-economic evidence supporting preferences for late resolution, and provides a
number of predictions that are consistent with aggregate evidence. We document that the expected
utility model cannot account for some of that evidence.
Key to the non-expected utility framework is the distinction between the parameters that govern
the EIS and the mortality risk aversion. This distinction allows the mortality risk aversion to be
identied directly from the evidence on the VSL. Our non-expected utility model predicts that,
although the monetary value of (statistical) life is lower in poorer than richer countries, the VSL-
to-income ratio decreases with income. This pattern is consistent with available international
evidence, as well as the cross-sectional empirical evidence within the US, as documented by Viscusi
and Aldy (2003).
We use our model to assess the economic value of changes in longevity around the world for the
period 1970 to 2005 as well as measure inequality in welfare across countries in 2005. According
to our model, gains in life expectancy in poorer countries during the period 1970 to 2005 were
particularly valuable in terms of welfare because longevity in poor countries tend to be lower and
therefore more valuable. As a result, the systematic increase in life expectancy in most countries
around the world since 1970 has decreased world welfare inequality in the last forty years to a larger
extent than expected utility models would have predicted, or what is suggested by simple per capita
income gures. On the other hand, according to our model, world inequality in 2005 is signicantly
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larger than inequality in per capita incomes. In other words, according to the model the relatively
short life span in many poor countries represents a signicant economic loss that adds to their
already low per capita income. Overall, the non-expected utility framework signicantly changes
the evaluation of welfare changes across countries and time relative to the standard expected utility
model.
Our model can be used in a number of other contexts in which the monetary value of additional
years of life is an important part of policy evaluation. We have in mind the literature on the
intersection between demographics, health and macroeconomics, one that has gained strength in
recent years. Within this literature, understanding the trends in health expenditures as populations
age, as well as the trade-o¤s governments with limited resources face, are examples of contexts in
which the framework we propose may be useful. We leave these questions for future work.
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Table 1 – Value of statistical life (millions of U$) 
Expected utility model 
 
                    ω 
EIS 
$100 $200 $300 $400 $500 
0.45 1324.8 567.4 345.3 242.7 184.6 
0.65 46.1 31.2 24.7 20.9 18.3 
0.85 10.7 8.9 7.9 7.2 6.7 
1.05 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 
1.25 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 
 
Notes:  Value of statistical life (VLS) is computed as the marginal rate of substitution between assets 
and survival according to the expected utility model. The VSL corresponds to the overall willingness 
to pay to save a life.  EIS is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and parameter ω is the 
minimum level of consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Lower bound income ymin (U$) 
Expected utility model 
 
                    ω 
EIS 
$100 $200 $300 $400 $500 
0.45 192 384 577 769 961 
0.65 223 445 668 890 1113 
0.85 251 502 753 1005 1256 
1.05 279 557 836 1114 1393 
1.25 305 610 916 1221 1526 
 
Notes:  Lower bound income ymin in the expected utility model corresponds to the level of per capita 
income at which the value of statistical life is exactly equal to the present value of foregone income. 
For per capita incomes below this lower bound the model predicts that the overall willingness to pay 
to save a life falls below the present value of foregone income, a natural lower bound. EIS is the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and parameter ω is the minimum level of consumption. 
  
 Table 3 – End of wars versus AIDS: 1990-2005 
 
 LE 2005 Δ LE R Rf-EU Rf 
Gains in life expectancy 
Rwanda 48 16 1.08 0.93 5.63 
Bhutan 65 12 2.16 2.27 3.33 
Nepal 65 11 1.20 1.15 1.76 
Losses in life expectancy 
Central Africa 46 -3 0.74 0.76 0.61 
South Africa 52 -9 1.29 1.18 0.89 
Botswana 51 -13 1.61 1.37 0.98 
Zimbabwe 41 -19 0.70 0.92 0.25 
 
Notes:  LE 2005 denotes life expectancy in 2005 according to the World Development Indicators. Δ 
LE denotes the difference between life expectancy in 2005 and 1990. R is per capita income in 2005 
relative to 1990 according to Penn World Tables 7.0. Rf refers to full income in 2005 relative to 1990. 
Full income includes an adjustment for the value of longevity according to the non-expected utility 
model. Rf-EU is the ratio of full incomes but using the expected utility model. 
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Source: World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 2. Life expectancy and income per capita across countries 
Ratio to US values in 2005 
Source: World Development Indicators and  Penn World Tables 7.0. 
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Figure 3. VSL-to-income ratio  and annual income 
International data 
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003),  Table 4. 
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Figure 4. VSL-to-income ratio and annual income 
Estimates for the US 
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003), Tables 2 and 3. 
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Figure 5. VSL-to-income ratio and per capita income across countries 
Expected utility model - 2005 
Notes: VSL (value of statistical life) is computed as the marginal rate of substitution between assets and survival according to the 
expected utility model. The VSL corresponds to the overall willingness to pay to save a life.  Per capita income in 2005 is from the 
Penn World Tables 7.0. 
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Figure 6. VSL-to-income ratio and income per capita across countries 
Non-expected and expected utility models - 2005 
Non-expected
Expected
Notes: VSL (value of statistical life) is computed as the marginal rate of substitution between assets and survival according to both the 
expected and non-expected utility models. The VSL corresponds to the overall willingness to pay to save a life.  Per capita income in 
2005 is from the Penn World Tables 7.0. 
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Figure 7. VSL and life expectancy across countries 
Non-expected and expected utility models -2005 
Non-expected
Expected
Notes: VSL (value of statistical life) is computed as the marginal rate of substitution between assets and survival according to both the 
expected and non-expected utility models. The VSL corresponds to the overall willingness to pay to save a life.  Per capita income in 
2005 is from the Penn World Tables 7.0, and life expectancy is from World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 8. Welfare gains across time - 1970 to 2005 
Non-expected and expected utility models 
RfEU/R
Rf/R
Notes: R is per capita income in 2005 relative to 1970. Rf refers to full income in 2005 relative to 1970. Full income include includes an adjustment for 
the value of longevity according to the non-expected utility model. RfEU is the ratio of full incomes but using the expected utility model. 
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Figure 9. Welfare  across countries - 2005  
Non-expected and expected utility models 
RfEU/R
Rf/R
Notes: R is per capita income relative to the US in 2005. Rf refers to full income  relative to the US. Full income include includes an adjustment for the 
value of longevity according to the non-expected utility model. RfEU is the ratio of full incomes but using the expected utility model. 
